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The elements of a monarchy do not exist among us; the habits of
the entire country are opposed to the reception of such a form of
government. Nor do we know, bad as our condition is rapidly
getting to be, strong as are the tendencies to social
dissolution, and to the abuses which demand force to subdue, that
anything would be gained by the adoption of any substitute for
the present polity of the country to be found in Europe. The
abuses there are possibly worse than our own, and the only
question would seem to be as to the degree of suffering and wrong
to which men are compelled to submit through the infirmities of
their own nature. There is one great advantage in the monarchical
principle, when subdued by liberal institutions, as in the case
of the government of that nation from which we are derived, which
it would seem a republic cannot possess. We allude to the
transmission of a nominal executive power that spares the
turmoil, expense, and struggles of an election, and which answers
all the purposes of the real authorities of the State in
designating those who are to exercise the functions of rulers for
the time being. It has often been predicted that the periodical
elections of the chief magistrate of this country will, at no
distant day, destroy the institutions. It would be idle to deny
that the danger manifestly increases with the expedients of
factions; and that there are very grave grounds for apprehending
the worst consequences from this source of evil. As it now is,
the working of the system has already produced a total departure
from the original intention of the Government; a scheme,
probably, that was radically defective when adopted, and which
contained the seeds of its own ruin. Recourse to electors[10] has
become an idle form, ponderous and awkward, and in some of its
features uselessly hazardous. We are in the habit of comparing
the cost of government in this country with that of other nations
in the Old World. Beyond a question, the Americans enjoy great
advantages in this important particular, owing to their exemption
from sources of expenses that weigh so heavily on those who rely
for the peace of society solely on the strong hand. But confining
the investigation simply to the cost of Executives it may well be
questioned if we have not adopted the most expensive mode at
present known among civilized nations. We entertain very little
doubt that the cost of a presidential election fully equals the
expenditures of the empire of Great Britain, liberal as they are
known to be, for the maintenance of the dignity of its chief
magistracy. Nor is this the worst of it; for while much of the
civil list of a monarch is usefully employed in cherishing the
arts, and in fostering industry, to say nothing of its boons to
the dependent and meritorious in the shape of pensions, not a
dollar of the millions that are wasted every fourth year among
ourselves in the struggles of parties, can be said to be applied
to a purpose that has not a greater tendency to evil than to
good. The simple publication of documents, perhaps, may form some
exception to these abuses; but even they are so much filled with
falsehoods, fallacies, audacious historical misstatements,
exaggerations, and every other abuse, naturally connected with
such struggles, that we are compelled to yield them our respect
and credulity with large allowances for caution and truth. Were
this the place, and did our limits permit, we would gladly pursue
this subject; for so completely has the hurrah of popular sway
looked down everything like real freedom in the discussion of
such a topic as to render the voice of dissent almost unknown to
us. But our purpose is merely to show what probable effects are
to flow from the abuses of the institutions on the growth of the
great commercial mart of which we are writing.
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